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1. Summary 
This rapid literature review focuses on the legitimacy of the state in Egypt after the 2013 military 
coup, with a focus on three issues: corruption, security and justice institutions, and local 
governance and civil society relations.  The main finding is that since the 2013 coup the new 
military government has embarked on widescale repression to quell dissent and consolidate its 
power.  The legitimacy of the authoritarian government rests on its ability to provide jobs, public 
services and security.  So far there is little evidence that the government is achieving these 
objectives (Brechenmacher, 2017; Hamzawy, 2017).  However, the crackdown on protests, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and religious structures leaves little space for citizens to 
express their dissatisfaction.   
There is very little literature on topics such as governance, state legitimacy, corruption, justice 
institutions and local governance in Egypt which is published after 2012. There was a flurry of 
literature around the 2011 revolution, but not much has been published since 2012. Experts 
contend that it is very dangerous and difficult to conduct research in Egypt and therefore little 
research is published in the academic and policy literature. The limited literature which is 
available after 2013 (in the academic and grey literature) focuses primarily on the growing 
authoritarianism and human rights abuses of the Egyptian state.  This rapid literature review was 
able to find two articles which discuss the strategies that the authoritarian government uses to 
maintain its legitimacy. The limited literature does not provide enough evidence to postulate 
about the future stability of the Egyptian state.   
After the 2013 coup, the military government took advantage of the climate of fear and its 
unchecked power during the interim period to introduce several repressive measures (Pinfari, 
2013).  The Sisi government used the following means of attaining legitimacy: 
 The military government justified its actions by utilising narratives relating to the war on terror 
and the historic role of the military as a source of stability to gain legitimacy (van de Bildt, 
2015); and  
 A referendum and elections including the admittance of international observers further 
facilitated legitimacy for the military government (Dunne, 2014).   
Fear of another mass protest and perceptions that the Mubarak government was lenient 
encouraged the Sisi government to pursue authoritarianism (Hamzawy, 2017; Transparency 
International, 2018).  The repression takes place against a background of rising economic and 
social crisis, political tension and failed promises by the military government (Transparency 
International, 2018). The following new legislation and legislative amendments were introduced 
by the Sisi government to suppress civil society and protest action:   
 A new Protest Law, amendments to the NGO Law and the Penal Code (Hamzawy, 2017); 
and  
 The Terrorism Law and referrals to military courts are applied broadly to subdue the activities 
of extremists as well as human rights activists.   
The new laws have enabled the government to suppress a range of civil society organisations, 
including those which provide services to the poor. There is no evidence that the government is 
able to fill the service vacuum created by such oppression (Brechenmacher, 2017).  In addition, 
intimidation and police brutality are used to suppress the opposition groups such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, political parties and human rights activists (Brechenmacher, 2017; Hamzawy, 
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2017).  A variety of narratives including nationalism, religious veneration of the president, 
conspiracy theories and defamation of opponents are used to bolster the legitimacy of and 
support for the military government (Hamzawy, 2017; van de Bildt, 2015).     
In Egypt the military is an important economic actor and has expanded its business activities 
since 2014.  The military is involved in several large-scale infrastructure projects which are prone 
to corruption (Reuters, 2018; Transparency International, 2018).  However, the literature does 
not discuss how these developments affect the legitimacy of the government.   
Although there was no specific reference to gender or disability in the literature, it is noted that 
the 2012 constitution did not protect the rights of women (Pinfari, 2013) and female activists have 
been murdered by the authoritarian regime (Hamzawy, 2017).   
2. Background 
After the 2011 revolution there was a short period of openness during which civil society and 
political parties could freely express their opinions or engage in politics (Dunne, 2014).  In 2013 
there was a military coup which removed President Morsi from office followed by a referendum 
(Pinfari, 2013).  The military was able to justify the coup due to the failures of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Khan, 2014).  Dunne (2014) argues that international observation of the 
referendum lent legitimacy to a flawed process.  Due to dangerous conditions several institutions, 
such as the Carter Centre and the European Union, sent small groups of experts to observe the 
process.  In addition, the Egyptian electoral commission authorised several domestic NGOs to 
deploy observers, although most lacked the resources to implement widespread observation 
(Dunne, 2014).   
The military government was keen to establish legitimacy and therefore submitted to processes 
like international observation (Dunne, 2014).  However, soon after the 2013 military coup the 
state once again resorted to violence and human rights abuses.  The military and President Sisi 
positioned themselves as the “ultimate guarantor of restoring stability and improving the living 
conditions” for the majority of Egyptian people (Hamzawy, 2017, p. 3).  Furthermore, the 2012 
constitution was weak in terms of protecting freedom of expression as well as the rights of 
women and minorities (Pinfari, 2013).  During the transitional government after the coup the 
military took advantage of the uncertainty and insecurity by introducing several repressive laws 
which have remained in force (Brechenmacher, 2017).   
3. Legitimacy of the state 
After the 2013 coup the military government sought legitimacy by demonising the Muslim 
Brotherhood and fostering historical narratives which venerate the Egyptian army and justify its 
continued prominence in the country’s politics (van de Bildt, 2015).  The military government 
promised improved economic conditions and security and although it continues to adhere to 
these promises, there is little evidence that they are succeeding. Social conditions have 
worsened rather than improved, while the threat of terrorism mainly in the Sinai region has not 
abated (Hamzawy, 2017). Since 2013 terrorist attacks have continued and the government’s use 
of indiscriminate killings and other human rights abuses in Sinai make many Egyptians question 
the effectiveness of the government’s strategy in this region. Radical sentiments are rising 
among thousands of young Egyptians who are detained in prisons or harassed by the security 
services. Several small groups have splintered from the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist 
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movements, further contributing to a proliferation of religiously orientated groups in Egypt 
(Hamzawy, 2017).  
In 2016 the government launched a reform programme approved by the International Monetary 
Fund1 which aims to address structural issues, such as the large budget deficit, government 
overspending, state subsidies and currency fluctuations. However, this programme has few 
prospects for improving economic conditions in the short-term. Currently around 28% of 
Egyptians live in poverty and the unemployment rate was 12.6% in 2016 (Hamzawy, 2017). 
Moreover, poor and vulnerable segments of the population have been negatively affected by the 
reform package.  High inflation rates of 25% in January 2017 and the devaluation of the currency 
by almost 50% have affected the middle classes as well as the poor. There has been a decline in 
financial support from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates since 2015, while 
investment from the West has increased little (Hamzawy, 2017).   
Several economic, social and development policies implemented by the government have been 
unsuccessful. These policies include large investments of public resources in mega construction 
projects that have uncertain returns and which were implemented with little public scrutiny or 
oversight (Hamzawy, 2017; Transparency International, 2018). Projects such as the second 
Suez Canal and the new administrative capital are controlled directly by economic organisations 
linked to the military establishment and therefore escape any demands for transparency or 
accountability.  So far only a few programmes, such as a cash transfer programme called the 
Solidarity and Dignity programme (Takaful wa Karama) implemented by the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity, are considered successful (Hamzawy, 2017).   
Strategies for maintaining legitimacy 
The War on Terror 
The military propagated the War on Terror as a narrative to justify its authoritarian stance. In 
2013 the Chief of the Armed Forces (later President Sisi) made a speech in which he called on 
the Egyptian people to give the military “a mandate to confront violence and terrorism” (van de 
Bildt, 2015, p. 257).  The discourse of security gave the military government free reign to 
dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood and other political opponents. There is no distinction between 
peaceful protesters and violent extremists.  All opponents of the state are automatically labelled 
as traitors or terrorists and subjected to violent suppression. The media (radio, television and 
print) plays an important role in supporting this narrative. Hani Shukrallah, an Egyptian political 
scientist, has criticised media support for the state which he calls “a dictatorship of opinion” (van 
de Bildt, 2015, p. 258).  Even religious structures such as mosques are monitored by the state to 
ensure that they do not deviate from the government narrative. 
The close alignment between national interests and national security allows the military to 
discredit those who support pluralism, civilian institutions and civilian politics (Hamzawy, 2017). 
Civilian leaders are characterised by the military as lacking the capacity to safeguard the nation 
and provide for the welfare of the country.  Furthermore, civilian groups are portrayed as 
opportunistic and seeking to pursue their own interests. In contrast, the military are portrayed as 
                                                   
1 This entailed an extended fund facility of around US$ 12 billion (Transparency International, 2018).   
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true nationalists and members of the only institution capable of promoting stability and prosperity 
in Egypt (Hamzawy, 2017). 
Ultimately, Egyptians are led to believe that there are no credible alternatives to the military (van 
de Bildt, 2015). Phrases such as “the president is working, but some institutions and agencies 
limit the success of his policies”, “the president is the only one aware of the magnitude of the 
responsibility placed on his shoulders and that is why he does not sleep except for a few hours 
daily” are repeated in the security controlled public and private media outlets to reinforce the 
narrative that the president is a saviour and build a personality cult around him (Hamzawy, 
2017). Moreover, the military establishment and security services are also portrayed as those 
who fight corruption in civilian institutions and guide policies towards greater efficiency. Civilian 
policies and politics are derided and described as sophistry.  
Nationalism and populism  
Nationalistic populism enables the military backed government to evade constitutional, legal and 
political accountability (Hamzawy, 2017).  The military utilises notions of religious and 
nationalistic populism to control the society. Such religious narratives elevate the president to a 
level where he becomes a “moral paragon” and therefore has the right to speak in the name of 
religion, as well as in terms of citizens’ private lives and ethics. Both official Islamic and Christian 
institutions are used by the government to impose its own interpretations of religion on society. 
“First the government frames obedience to the ruling general and approval of its policies as a 
religious duty. Second, the generals’ claim that the government-promoted understanding of 
religion is moderate, so anything that goes against it can be labelled extremist. This extends from 
the religious-based platforms of non-violent opposition movements, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, to violent jihadist groups. Third, they depict the ruling general as a protector of 
dignified morals and values, so diverging moral conceptions can be denounced as inappropriate 
for Egypt – a denunciation frequently addressed to human rights activists and pro-democracy 
civil society organisations. And fourth, the generals use religious symbols and statements in the 
public space to rationalise repression and human rights abuses and to demand popular support 
for the Messiah in uniform” (Hamzawy, 2017, p. 5). 
Conspiracy theories and defamation  
The Egyptian government is unable to justify its repression given its lacklustre performance with 
regard to restoring the economy or security (Hamzawy, 2017; van de Bildt, 2015). Hence, they 
have employed a multitude of narratives to justify their approach including conspiracy theories 
and defamation of individuals who criticise the state.  These messages are spread using the 
security-controlled public and private media institutions. The government blames its failings on 
opposition movements as well as pro-democracy groups to divert blame away from high-ranking 
military generals.  Conspiracy theories are used to accuse civil society organisations of serving 
the interests of foreign governments. Public and private media outlets controlled by the Egyptian 
security forces deny accusations of human rights abuses, such as the death of the well-known 
left-wing activist, Shaimaa al-Sabbagh.  She was shot in 2015 during a peaceful march to 
commemorate the fourth anniversary of the 2011 revolution (Hamzawy, 2017).  Defamation 
campaigns are used to discredit young activists and other dissenters.  “In a public space in which 
free speech about the failures and transgressions of the government is not allowed, these 
narratives amount to a systematic effort to brainwash the population and permeate debates 
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about public affairs with incorrect information, fake news and outright lies” (Hamzawy, 2017, p. 
5).   
4. Corruption and legitimacy 
There is a strong perception in Egypt that one has to have connections to get access to jobs, 
services or business opportunities.  This concept of nepotism is referred to as wasta 
(Transparency International, 2018).  In general, the state is expected to provide jobs, subsidised 
goods, free education and health care in exchange for public tolerance of elite corruption.  
However, pervasive corruption and the inability of the state to deliver jobs and public services 
was a key driver of the 2011 protests (Fayed, 2017).   
Military dominance in the economy 
The military has been close to the government since 1952.  The 2014 constitution award special 
status for the military establishment. The defence budget cannot be discussed in a transparent 
manner and there are unknown mechanisms of oversight for the Armed Forces (Dunne, 2014).  
The Defence budget was US$ 4.5 billion in 2016 but its breakdown is a state secret 
(Transparency International, 2018).   
The Egyptian military is a major player in the economy.  During the liberalisation of the economy 
which occurred in the 1990s, the business activities of the military expanded into infrastructure, 
agriculture and mining.  Enterprises owned or operated by the military benefited from tax breaks, 
preferential access, conscript labour, secretive bank accounts and lack of effective oversight 
(Transparency International, 2018). It is estimated that up to 40% of the Egyptian economy is 
controlled by the military, but such estimates vary considerably and some contend that the 
military only controls 1.5% of GDP (Transparency International, 2018).  The military runs its 
businesses through the National Service Products Organisation (NSPO) which was established 
in 1979 by presidential decree.  There is no information on the revenue, profits or tax compliance 
of the NSPO.  According to its website, it owns 21 companies in many sectors.  The National 
Authority for Military Production and the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation and the Armed 
Forces Engineering Authority are key organisations in the military business conglomerate.   
 
Figure 1 depicts the concentration of military businesses by sector and also indicates whether 
the businesses are aligned to the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Military Production or the Arab 
Organisation for Industrialisation.  See: Figure 1:  Egyptian military business interests2 , Reuters 
(2018), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/egypt-economy-military/#interactive-
egypt 
 
Since 2013 the armed forces and President Sisi have prioritised mega projects such as the Suez 
Canal Corridor Development Project, the expansion of six Egyptian ports, the construction of 
many tunnels and industrial zones and dredging of a parallel canal to allow for two-way traffic.  In 
addition, the government is investing in building a new capital city. Such mega projects are prone 
                                                   
2 Reuters (2018) obtained the data from websites of Egyptian ministries, phone calls to ministries, a CIA report 
and an academic dissertation on the topic.   
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to corruption.  There is no information on the number of contracts which the army may have. In 
2013 the government amended the 1998 Tenders Law to allow ministers to by-pass tender 
processes (Transparency International, 2018).  The military has expanded and diversified its 
economic portfolio since 2014.  This is part of a deliberate strategy by President Sisi, who argues 
that awarding the army with major contracts would help to revive the economy.  There is little 
information about the revenue and profits earned by economic entities associated with the 
military. Foreign investors are reluctant to invest in sectors which are dominated by the military 
(Reuters, 2018).   
 
Military businesses crowd out the private sector as they enjoy many advantages. In addition, the 
military has preferential access to land which it uses to enhance its business advantages 
(Transparency International, 2018).  The military sustains a patronage network and uses its 
agriculture sector firms to provide cheaper food.  The military’s role in the agricultural sector 
enables it to attain some legitimacy.  For example, when there was a shortage of baby milk 
powder in Egypt, the military stepped in to increase imports of the product and portrayed itself as 
a promoter of national interests (Transparency International, 2018, p. 12).   
In addition, the military is consolidating its power in other ways which lead to less accountability 
(Transparency International, 2018): 
 Military officers are in senior government positions;  
 Former offices hold senior positions in the civil service; and 
 Ousting of auditors and judges who cannot be controlled.   
 
In 2015 several retired military and police officers stood for parliamentary elections and this 
represented a further extension of the military’s influence. In parliament retired officers have 
become heads of blocks and subcommittees. The dominance of former military and police 
officers in the legislative and judicial branches of the government has eroded checks and 
balances in the political system and facilitated the passing of repressive laws and other 
antidemocratic policies (Hamzawy, 2017). Monitoring agencies such as the Central Auditing 
Organisation lack the authority to hold the military accountable. The number of military and 
security generals appointed to key executive committee positions in Parliament has also been on 
the rise (Transparency International, 2018).   
5. Security and justice institutions 
A new authoritarian regime has emerged in Egypt. The country is ruled by the military 
establishment, security services and intelligence agencies (Hamzawy, 2017).  The Mubarak 
government was assumed to have been a model for partial liberalisation which opened the path 
for mass protests. The repression introduced by the Sisi government is driven by fear that there 
could be further mass protests (Brechenmacher, 2017).  Human rights abuses are justified on the 
grounds that they will save Egypt from civil unrest, terrorism and economic decline.   
In terms of regional security Egypt plays a limited role and shares the burden of providing 
regional security with other countries in the region. Moreover, Egypt can be regarded as a free 
rider which has neglected its responsibilities in the region (Pinfari, 2014).   
8 
Legislation 
Overall, the legislature has become a rubber stamp which authorises repressive laws with little 
debate or scrutiny.  The following legislation or legislative amendments enabled the government 
to engage in widespread repression.  Between 2013 and 2016, 60,000 persons were detained or 
imprisoned. There have also been mass killings and local human rights organisations claim that 
754 extrajudicial killings occurred in the first half of 2016 alone (Hamzawy, 2017; Transparency 
International, 2018). Furthermore, there is extensive torture in prisons and medical neglect which 
leads to a high death rate (Hamzawy, 2017).   
The Protest Law 
in November 2013 the interim president, Adley Mansour, used his temporary legislative powers 
to issue the Organising the Right to Public Meetings, Processions and Peaceful Demonstrations 
law.  This became known as the Protest Law. Under the Protest Law citizens are required to give 
notification at least three days before and no more than 15 days in advance of any organised 
meeting, procession or protest (Hamzawy, 2017). The security services have the absolute power 
to cancel or postpone a demonstration. They can also change the location and modify the path 
on the grounds that they have credible information or evidence that there will be a threat to 
security and peace. This law has effectively eliminated citizens’ right to peaceful assembly and 
demonstration. The law also allows security services to prevent civilians from protesting in front 
of public offices. Security services are allowed to delineate secure zones around public 
institutions and facilities in which demonstrations and rallies are prohibited. Consequently, it has 
become unlawful to protest near the legislative, executive and judicial institutions and other 
institutions that would attract attention to citizens with grievances. 
The government is able to ban meetings, rallies, marches and demonstrations which it views as 
disturbing societal peace or potentially resulting in the damage of public or private property 
(Hamzawy, 2017). Protests can also be banned if they could lead to road blockages or prevent 
other citizens from exercising their rights. Rallies, strikes and sit-ins that could lead to damage of 
state-owned means of production or individual businesses are also prohibited. The law also 
entitles the police to use batons as well as rubber and non-rubber bullets to disperse meetings, 
rallies, marches and demonstrations which are deemed unpeaceful. Consequently, there has 
been an increase in the use of violence to disperse protests.  Fines and imprisonment are used 
to punish those who violate the Protest Law (Hamzawy, 2017).   
The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) struck down in Article 10 of the Protest Law in 
December 2016. According to the SCC it was unconstitutional for the security services to 
regulate or prevent demonstrations (Hamzawy, 2017). The SCC also ruled that the duty of 
citizens to notify security services of their intention to demonstrate was not designed to empower 
the government to restrict constitutional rights. Moreover, only a competent court in accordance 
with due process has the right to impose restrictions on the constitutional right to protest.   
The NGO Law 
Since 2013 the government regards civil society organisations, especially those involved with 
human rights or legal assistance, as seditious elements (Hamzawy, 2017). In 2002 the NGO law 
was introduced which allowed the government to restrict the establishment of NGOs, subject 
them to heavy bureaucratic control, limit their funding and generally compromise the 
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independence of civil society (Brechenmacher, 2017). Moreover, the security and intelligence 
services were permitted to monitor (including surveillance) and disrupt civil society activities. 
There was no attempt to amend the NGO Law after the coup. However, in 2016 new legislation 
was proposed by a pro-government parliamentarian (Brechenmacher, 2017). Although the new 
law acknowledges that NGOs have a right to exist, they are compelled to register with the 
Ministry of Social Solidarity and the ministry has the power to decline registration without judicial 
approval for many reasons.  NGOs which engage in activities undertaken by political parties 
remain banned (Brechenmacher, 2017).  
The new NGO legislation extends the ban on organisations to trade unions, labour movements 
and professional syndicates. It also bans organisations in areas which are labelled as harmful to 
the nation (Hamzawy, 2017).  Civil society organisations are not permitted to engage with 
professional syndicates, such as journalists or doctors syndicates. Groups like the Egyptian 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights or the Centre for Trade Unions and Workers Services 
are not permitted to register as NGOs and therefore cannot operate legally. The legislation 
establishes a new government body, the National Agency for Organising the Cooperation of 
Foreign NGOs. This agency has jurisdiction over approving the establishment of foreign NGOs in 
Egypt and enables governments to administer the affairs of domestic and foreign NGOs 
(Hamzawy, 2017).  The agency also monitors the transfer of funds from international NGOs to 
their offices in Egypt, the receipt of foreign funds by domestic NGOs and donations to NGOs 
from groups and individuals within Egypt and from abroad. NGOs are expected to prove that 
approved funds are spent on approved activities. A further layer of scrutiny is added because 
NGOs are overseen by the Central Auditing Agency. It is anticipated that these restrictions will 
discourage Egyptian people from donating local NGOs and thus curtail their capacity and 
influence (Hamzawy, 2017). 
The Penal Code 
In 2014 Article 78 of the Penal Code was amended by the legislative prerogative of the interim 
president Sisi (Hamzawy, 2017).  The amendment enabled the government to criminalise several 
acts without defining them in an objective, legal manner.  For example, it is possible to 
criminalise acts which could harm the nation’s interest or breach public peace and order.  Such 
legal ambiguities enable the government to use the Penal Code as a tool of repression. Article 78 
enables the government to blur the distinction between those who have committed acts of terror 
versus those working in civil society to promote human rights and freedom (Hamzawy, 2017).   
The Terrorism Law 
In 2015 the law of Organising the Lists of Terrorist Entities and Terrorists, otherwise known as 
the Terrorism Law, was enacted. This law enables the government to legally keep under 
surveillance and penalise individuals and organisations involved in peaceful activities which 
oppose the government’s policies. Accusations of terrorism can be widely used without legal 
restraint against opponents of the government (Hamzawy, 2017).  Vague terminology enables 
the label of terrorist to be widely applied and the government is not required to prove its 
accusations against alleged terrorists through transparent, judicial procedures. Organisations 
and individuals can lose their assets, licences, reputations and passports and also be banned 
from travel by the Terrorism Law (Hamzawy, 2017).   
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Military Court Law 
Since 2014 the army was permitted to assist the police in securing and protecting public 
institutions, offices and facilities (Hamzawy, 2017).  Such sites, which include public universities 
and government-owned industrial facilities, fall under the jurisdiction of the military court system. 
In addition, the law has been used to refer civilians to military tribunals which lack transparency 
and safeguards of fairness. University students, workers and labour activists participating in 
peaceful protests can be referred to military tribunals. There are more than 7,000 civilian cases 
which were referred to military courts between 2014 and 2015 (Hamzawy, 2017).   
6. Local governance and civil society relations 
There are very few articles which focus on local government in Egypt.  There are 29 administrative 
sections called governorates or municipalities.  They vary in terms of size, population and resource 
allocation.  The municipality is further divided into cities and districts which are then divided into 
smaller entities called neighbourhoods (in urban areas) or villages (in outlying areas) (Abdelsalam, 
Reddick, ElKadi, & Gama, 2012).  This review could not find recent literature on the legitimacy of 
local government. However, in Egypt several public services which should be provided by local 
governments are provided by civil society organisations (Brechenmacher, 2017), therefore civil 
society relations are discussed. 
Civil society relations 
Initially the repressive tactics were used to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood which was the 
main target of the state (van de Bildt, 2015).  This includes the murder of a legislator, Nassar al 
Haffi and a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance Office, Mohammed Kamal.  
Excessive force was used to end protests by Muslim Brotherhood supporters which led to the 
deaths of almost 1,000 Egyptians.  Gradually, civil society leaders opposed to the deteriorating 
human rights conditions have also become victims of repression (Hamzawy, 2017). For example, 
in 2015 Heshem Gaafar, a journalist and chairman of the Mada Foundation for Media 
Development, was arrested and a prominent lawyer, Negad El-Borai, was summoned for 
questioning before multiple judicial bodies.  Ahmed Abdullah, the chairman of the Board of 
Trustees of the Egyptian Coordination for Rights and Freedom, was arrested in 2016.  Human 
rights lawyers, like Malek Adly and Haitham Mohamadien, were arrested. There were bans on 
the Egyptian Democratic Institute, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, the Hisham 
Mubarak Law Centre, the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information and the Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights.  By 2017 Egyptian civil society was experiencing more repression 
than it had witnessed in decades (Brechenmacher, 2017). According to Hamzawy (2017) there is 
an “ever widening circle of enemies” which includes student protesters, labour activists and 
groups of young citizens who were involved in the revolution.  
The Obama administration and the European Union opted for quiet diplomacy in dealing with the 
NGO crisis and did not want to jeopardise bilateral relations with Egypt.  The Trump 
administration has opted not to focus on human rights, but instead prioritises counterterrorism in 
its relations with Egypt (Brechenmacher, 2017).   
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Service delivery 
Local service delivery has been affected by the crackdown on religious charity organisations. For 
example, El Gameya El Sharey is a religious organisation which offers healthcare services to the 
poor. The organisation operated 30 medical centres with over 1,000 branches in deprived areas. 
After the coup El Gameya El Sharey was accused of spreading radical Islam and its assets were 
frozen. Similarly, other religious charities have been forced to rely on volunteers and cut back on 
service provision. There is no evidence that the government is able to plug the gap in terms of 
service delivery (Brechenmacher, 2017). Furthermore, even secular civil society organisations 
are struggling to provide services due to funding shortages.  International donors have also cut 
back on development projects. Organisations which apply for funding approval to the Ministry of 
Social Solidarity often do not get replies. They are forced to scale back their work or operate 
illegally and risk closure. The Catholic NGO, Caritas, won a court case against the Ministry of 
Social Solidarity which had argued that the German funders of Caritas represented a threat to 
Egyptian national security. Some civil society organisations are facing the difficult choice of 
closing down or collaborating with the government in order to remain open and provide services 
for the poor (Brechenmacher, 2017).   
E-government 
The few articles which are available on local government relate to e-government in Egypt 
(Abdelghaffar & Magdy, 2012; Abdelsalam, Reddick, & El Kadi, 2012; Reddick, Abdelsalam, & 
Elkadi, 2011). Although local entities have a limited degree of administrative freedom they are 
financially and politically managed by the central government.  Egypt has experimented with 
various e-government initiatives to improve administration at the local level.  In 2001 an ICT 
strategy which became known as the Egyptian Information Society Initiative (EISI) was 
established. EISI had seven pillars including e-government.  Initially e-government consisted of 
four main sub-programmes which were managed under the Egyptian Local Government 
Development Programme (ELGDP).  ELGDP has three main projects: service enhancement, 
development of web portals for municipalities and cities and relationship management systems 
(Klischewski, 2014). 
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